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Abstract: This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asym-
metric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot
observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy observation process, while the leader
can completely observe the state process. Open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is considered. The
follower first solve an stochastic optimal control problem with partial observation, the maximum
principle and verification theorem are obtained. Then the leader turns to solve an optimal con-
trol problem for a conditional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation, and
both maximum principle and verification theorem are proved. An linear-quadratic Stackelberg
stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation is discussed to illustrate the the-
oretical results in this paper. With the aid of some Riccati equations, the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium admits its state estimate feedback representation.
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tional mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equation, Riccati equation
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1 Introduction
The Stackelberg game is an important type of hierarchical noncooperative games (Bas¸ar and
Olsder [1]), whose study can be traced back to the pioneering work by Stackelberg [23]. The
Stackelberg game is usually know as the leader-follower game, whose economic background
comes from markets where some firms have power of domination over others. The solutions of
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the Stackelberg differential game, are called Stackelberg equilibrium points in which there are
usually two players with asymmetric roles, one leader and one follower. In order to obtain the
Stackelberg equilibrium points, it is usual to divide the game problem into two parts. In the first
part—the follower’s problem, firstly the leader announces his strategy, then the follower will make
an instantaneous response, and choose an optimal strategy corresponding to the given leader’s
strategy to optimize his/her cost functional. In the second part—the leader’s problem, knowing
the follower would take such an optimal strategy, the leader will choose an optimal strategy to
optimize his/her cost functional. In a word, a distinctive feature of the Stackelberg differential
games is that, the decisions must be made by two players and one of them is subordinated to
the other because of the asymmetric roles, therefore one player must make a decision after the
other player’s decision is made. The Stackelberg game has been widely applied in the principal-
agent/optimal contract problems (Cvitanic´ and Zhang [6]), the newsvendor/wholesaler problems
(Øksendal et al. [18]) and optimal reinsurance problems (Chen and Shen [5]).
There exist some literatures about the Stackelberg differential game for Itoˆ’s stochastic dif-
ferential equations (SDEs for short) in the past decades. Let us mention a few. Yong [39] studied
the indefinite linear-quadratic (LQ for short) leader-follower differential game with random co-
efficients and control-dependent diffusion. Forward-backward stochastic differential equations
(FBSDEs for short) and Riccati equations are applied to obtain the state feedback representa-
tion of the open-loop Stacklelberg equilibrium points. Bensoussan et al. [3] introduced several
solution concepts in terms of the players’ information sets, and studied LQ Stackelberg games
under both adapted open-loop and closed-loop memoryless information structures, whereas the
control variables do not enter the diffusion coefficient of the state equation. Mukaidani and Xu
[17] studied the Stackelberg game with one leader and multiple followers, in an infinite time
horizon. The Stackelberg equilibrium points are developed, by cross-coupled algebraic Riccati
equations, under both cooperative and non-cooperative settings of the followers, to attain Pareto
optimality and Nash equilibrium, respectively. Xu and Zhang [37] and Xu et al. [36] investigated
the LQ Stackelberg differential games with time delay. Li and Yu [11] proved the solvability of a
kind of coupled FBSDEs with a multilevel self-similar domination-monotonicity structure, then
it is used to characterize the unique equilibrium of an LQ generalized Stackelberg stochastic
differential game with hierarchy in a closed form. Moon and Bas¸ar [16], Lin et al. [14] studied
the the LQ mean-field Stackelberg stochastic differential games. Du and Wu [7] investigated an
LQ Stackelberg game of mean-field backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs for short).
Zheng and Shi [41] researched the Stackelberg game of BSDEs with complete information. Feng
et al. [8] considered the LQ Stackelberg game of BSDEs with constraints.
However, in all the above literatures about the Stackelberg game, the authors assume that
both the leader and the follower could fully observe the state of the controlled stochastic systems.
Obviously, this is not practical in reality. Generally speaking, the players in the games can only
obtain partial information in most cases. Then it is very natural to study the Stackelberg
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stochastic differential game under partial information. In fact, some efforts have been made
such as the following. Shi et al. [19, 20] studied the Stackelberg stochastic differential game
and introduced a new explanation for the asymmetric information feature, that the information
available to the follower is based on the some sub-σ-algebra of that available to the leader.
Shi et al. [21] investigated the LQ Stackelberg stochastic differential game with overlapping
information, where the follower’s and the leader’s information have some joint part, while they
have no inclusion relations. Wang et al. [26] discussed an asymmetric information mean-field
type LQ Stackelberg stochastic differential game with one leader and two followers.
Noting that in the game frameworks of papers [31, 4, 19, 20, 25, 21, 26], the information
available to the players are described by the filtration generated by standard Brownian motions.
In fact, in realty there exists many situations, where only some observation processes could be
observed by the players. For example, in the financial market, the investors can only observe the
security prices. Thus the portfolio process is required to be adapted to the natural filtration of the
security price process (Xiong and Zhou [35]). In general, partially observed problems are related
with filtering theory (Liptser and Shiryayev [15], Bensoussan [2], Xiong [34]). Partially observed
stochastic optimal control and differential games have been researched by many authors, such
as Li and Tang [13], Tang [24], Wang and Wu [27], Huang et al. [10], Wu [32], Shi and Wu [22],
Wang et al. [28, 29, 30], Wu and Zhuang [33].
Inspired by the above literatures, in this paper we study the Stackelberg differential game
with asymmetric noisy observation, with deterministic coefficients and convex control domains.
To the best of our knowledge, papers on the topic about partially observed Stackelberg dif-
ferential games are quite lacking, except Li et al. [12]. Note that in [12], the leader-follower
Stackelberg stochastic differential game under a symmetric, partial observed information is re-
searched. The novelty of the formulation and the contribution in this paper is the following.
(1) A new kind of Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation
is introduced. In our framework, the control processes of the follower are required to be adapted
to the information filtration generated by the observation process, which is a Brownian motion is
the original probability space, while the information filtration available to the leader is generated
by both the Brownian noise and the observation process.
(2) For the follower’s problem, a stochastic optimal control problem with partial observation
is solved. The partial information maximum principle (Theorem 3.1) is given, which is direct
from Bensoussan [2], Li and Tang [13]. Thanks for a mild assumption motivated by Huang et
al. [9], the partial information verification theorem (Theorem 3.2) is proved. It is remarkable
that the Hamiltonian function (3.4) and adjoint equations (3.5), (3.6) are different from those
in [12], but similar as [13].
(3) For the leader’s problem, a stochastic optimal control problem of FBSDE is solved. Since
the control processes are required by the information filtration generated by both the Brownian
motion and the observation process, we encounter a difficulty when applying the techniques in
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Wu [32] and Wang et al. [28]. We overcome this difficulty by again the mild assumption used in
Theorem 3.2 and Bayes’ formula, to obtain the maximum principle of the leader (Theorem 3.3).
However, by Clarke’s generalized gradient, we could prove the verification theorem (Theorem
3.4) of the leader only in the special case, since the difficulty is fatal.
(4) For the LQ case, it consists of an LQ stochastic optimal control problem with partial
observation for the follower, and followed by an LQ stochastic optimal control problem of the
coupled conditional mean-field FBSDE with complete observation information for the leader.
The state estimate feedback representation of the Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained, via some
Riccati equations, by Theorems 3.1-3.4, and the technique of Yong [39].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the Stackelberg stochastic differ-
ential game with asymmetric noisy observation is formulated. In Section 3, maximum principles
and verification theorems are proved, for the problems of the follower and the leader, respec-
tively. Then the LQ Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation
is investigated in Section 4. Specially, Subsection 4.1 is devoted to the solution to an LQ stochas-
tic optimal control problem with partial observation of the follower. Subsection 4.2 is devoted
to the solution to an LQ stochastic optimal control problem of coupled conditional mean-field
FBSDE with complete observation information of the leader. The open-loop Stackelberg equilib-
rium is represented as its state estimate feedback form. Finally, Section 5 gives some concluding
remarks.
2 Problem formulation
Let T > 0 be be a finite time duration. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space on which two
independent standard Brownian motions W (·) and Y (·) valued in Rd1 and Rd2 are defined. For
t ≥ 0, FWt and F
Y
t are the natural filtration generated by W (·) and Y (·), respectively, and we
set Ft = F
W
t ×F
Y
t . E denotes the expectation under probability P. In this paper, L
2
FT
(Ω,Rn)
denotes the set of Rn-valued, FT -measurable, square-integrable random variables, L
2
F (0, T ;R
n)
denotes the set of Rn-valued, Ft-adapted, square integrable processes on [0, T ], and L
∞(0, T ;Rn)
denotes the set of Rn-valued, bounded functions on [0, T ].
Let us consider the following controlled stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short):
{
dxu1,u2(t) = b(t, xu1,u2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt + σ(t, x
u1,u2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xu1,u2(0) = x0,
(2.1)
where u1(·) and u2(·) are control processes taken by the two players in the game, labeled 1 (the
follower) and 2 (the leader) with values in nonempty convex sets U1 ⊆ R
m1 and U2 ⊆ R
m2 ,
respectively. Here, x0 ∈ R
n, b : [0, T ] × Rn × U1 × U2 → R
n, σ : [0, T ] × Rn × U1 × U2 → R
n×d1
are given functions.
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We assume that the state process xu1,u2(·) cannot be observed by the follower directly, but
he/she can observe a related process Y (·), which satisfies the following controlled stochastic
system:
Y (t) =
∫ t
0
h(s, xu1,u2(s), u1(s), u2(s))ds +W
u1,u2(t), (2.2)
where h(t, x, u1, u2) : [0, T ] × R
n × U1 × U2 → R
d2 are give functions, and W u1,u2(·) denotes a
stochastic process depending on the control process pair (u1(·), u2(·)).
The following hypotheses are assumed.
(A1) The functions b, σ are linear growth and continuously differentiable with respect to
u1, u2 and x, and their partial derivatives with respect to u1, u2 and x are all uniformly bounded.
Moreover, the function h is continuously differentiable with respect to u1, u2 and x, and there
exists some constant K > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, u1 ∈ R
d1 , u2 ∈ R
d2 ,
|h(t, x, u1, u2)|+ |hx(t, x, u1, u2)|+ |hu1(t, x, u1, u2)|+ |hu2(t, x, u1, u2)| ≤ K.
Motivated by some interesting random phenomena in realty, we begin to explain the asym-
metric information between the follower and the leader, in our Stackelberg game problem. In
the follower’s problem, a stochastic optimal control problem with partial information need to be
solved, since the information available to him/her at time t is based on the filtration generated
by the noisy observation process FYt = σ{Y (s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. However, in the leader’s problem,
a stochastic optimal control problem with complete information is required to be solved, since
the information available to him/her at time t is based on the complete information/filtration
Ft. Obviously, we have F
Y
t ⊆ Ft and the information of the follower and the leader has the
asymmetric feature and structure.
Next, we define the admissible control sets of the follower and the leader, respectively, as
follows:
U1 =
{
u1
∣∣∣u1 : Ω× [0, T ]→ U1 is FYt -adapted and sup
0≤t≤T
E|u1(t)|
i <∞, i = 1, 2, · · ·
}
,
U2 =
{
u2
∣∣∣u2 : Ω× [0, T ]→ U2 is Ft-adapted and sup
0≤t≤T
E|u2(t)|
i <∞, i = 1, 2, · · ·
}
.
(2.3)
For any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, we know that (2.1) admits a unique solution under hypothesis
(A1), which is denoted by xu1,u2(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n).
From Girsanov’s theorem, it follows that if we define
Zu1,u2(t) := exp
{∫ t
0
h⊤(s, xu1,u2(s), u1(s), u2(s))dY (s)
−
1
2
∫ T
0
∣∣h(s, xu1,u2(s), u1(s), u2(s))∣∣2ds
}
,
(2.4)
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i.e., {
dZu1,u2(t) = Zu1,u2(t)h⊤(t, xu1,u2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dY (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Zu1,u2(0) = 1,
(2.5)
and if dPu1,u2 := Zu1,u2(T )dP, then Pu1,u2 is a new probability and (W (·),W u1,u2(·)) is an
R
d1+d2-valued Brownian motion under Pu1,u2 .
In our Stackelberg game problem, knowing that the leader has chosen u2(·) ∈ U2, the follower
would like to choose an FYt -adapted control u¯1(·) ≡ u¯1(·;u2(·)) to minimize his cost functional
J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = E
u1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
l1(t, x
u1,u2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+G1(x
u1,u2(T ))
]
, (2.6)
where Eu1,u2 denotes the expectation under the probability Pu1,u2 . Here functions l1 : [0, T ] ×
R
n × U1 × U2 → R and G1 : R
n → R are given.
Problem of the follower. For any chosen u2(·) ∈ U2 by the leader, choose an F
Y
t -adapted
control u¯1(·) = u¯1(·;u2(·)) ∈ U1 such that
J1(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≡ J1(u¯1(·;u2(·)), u2(·)) = inf
u1∈U1
J1(u1(·), u2(·)), (2.7)
subject to (2.1) and (2.6). Such a u¯1(·) = u¯1(·;u2(·)) is called an optimal control, and the
corresponding solution xu¯1,u2(·) to (2.1) is called an optimal state process, for the follower.
In the following procedure of the game problem, once knowing that the follower would take
such an optimal control u¯1(·) = u¯1(·;u2(·)), the leader would like to choose an Ft-adapted control
u¯2(·) to minimize his cost functional
J2(u¯1(·), u2(·)) = E
u¯1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
l2(t, x
u¯1,u2(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))dt+G2(x
u¯1,u2(T ))
]
. (2.8)
Here functions l2 : [0, T ] × R
n × U1 × U2 → R and G2 : R
n → R are given.
Problem of the leader. Find an Ft-adapted control u¯2(·) ∈ U2 such that
J2(u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ≡ J2(u¯1(·; u¯2(·)), u¯2(·)) = inf
u2∈U2
J2(u¯1(·;u2(·)), u2(·)), (2.9)
subject to (2.1) and (2.8). Such a u¯2(·) is called an optimal control, and the corresponding
solution xu¯1,u¯2(·) to (2.1) is called an optimal state process, for the leader. We will restate the
problem for the leader in more detail, since its precise description has to involve the solution to
Problem of the follower.
We refer to the problem mentioned above as a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with
asymmetric noisy observations. If there exists a control process pair (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) satisfy (2.7)
and (2.9), we refer to it as an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
We also introduce the following assumption.
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(A2) For i = 1, 2, the functions li, Gi are continuously differentiable with respect to x, u1, u2,
and there exists a constant C > 0 such that for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, u1 ∈ R
d1 , u2 ∈ R
d2 ,
(
1 + |x|2 + |u1|
2 + |u2|
2
)−1
|li(t, x, u1, u2)|+
(
1 + |x|+ |u1|+ |u2|
)−1(
|lix(t, x, u1, u2)|
+ |liu1(t, x, u1, u2)|+ |liu2(t, x, u1, u2)|
)
≤ C,
(1 + |x|2)−1|Gi(x)|+ (1 + |x|)
−1|Gix(x)| ≤ C.
3 Maximum principle and verification theorem for Stackelberg
equilibrium
In this paper, we frequently omit some time variable t in some mathematical formula for sim-
plicity, if there exists no ambiguity.
3.1 The problem of the follower
For any chosen u2(·) ∈ U2, we first consider Problem of the follower which is a partially
observed stochastic optimal control problem.
By Bayes’s formula, Problem of the follower is equivalent to minimize
J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = E
[∫ T
0
Zu1,u2(t)l1(t, x
u1,u2(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ Z
u1,u2(T )G1(x
u1,u2(T ))
]
(3.1)
over U1, subject to (2.1) and (2.5).
We first present the following lemma about some estimates for xu1,u2(·) and Z(·), which
belong to Li and Tang [13].
Lemma 3.1. For any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, let x
u1,u2(·) be the corresponding solution to (2.1).
Then there exists some constant C > 0, such that

sup
0≤t≤T
E|xu1,u2(t)|2 ≤ C
[
1 + sup
0≤t≤T
E
(
|u1(t)|
2 + |u2(t)|
2
)]
,
sup
0≤t≤T
E|Zu1,u2(t)|2 ≤ C.
(3.2)
The following maximum principle for Problem of the follower can be obtained by the
classical results in [2] and [13]. We omit the details.
Theorem 3.1. Let (A1) and (A2) hold. For any given u2(·) ∈ U2, if u¯1(·) is an optimal control
of Problem of the follower, then the maximum condition
E
u¯1,u2
[〈
H1u1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K), v1 − u¯1(t)
〉∣∣FYt ] ≥ 0, ∀v1 ∈ U1, (3.3)
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holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], Pu¯1,u2-a.s., where the Hamiltonian function H1 : [0, T ]×R
n×U1×U2×
R
n × Rn×d1 × Rn×d2 → R is defined by
H1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2, p, k,K) :=
〈
p(t), b(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2)
〉
+ tr
{
k(t)⊤σ(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2)
}
+
〈
K(t), h(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2)
〉
+ l1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2),
(3.4)
the adjoint process pairs (P (·),K(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R)×L
2
F (0, T ;R
d1) and (p(·), k(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n)
× L2F (0, T ;R
n×d1) satisfy the following two BSDEs, respectively:{
−dP (t) = l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)dt−K
⊤(t)dW u¯1,u2(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
P (T ) = G1(x
u¯1,u2(T )),
(3.5)


−dp(t) =
[
l1x(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2) + h
⊤
x (t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)K
⊤(t) + bx(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)p(t)
+ σx(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)k(t)
]
dt− k(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = G1x(x
u¯1,u2(T )).
(3.6)
Then we continue to give the sufficient condition (that is, verification theorem) to guarantee
the optimality for control u¯1(·) of Problem of the follower.
Theorem 3.2. Let (A1) and (A2) hold. For any given u2(·) ∈ U2, let u¯1(·) ∈ U1 and x
u¯1.u2(·)
be the corresponding state. Let (P (·),K(·)) and (p(·), k(·)) be the adjoint process pairs satisfying
(3.5) and (3.6). Suppose for all (t, x, u1, u2) ∈ [0, T ] × R
n × U1 × U2, Z
u1,u2(t) is FYt -adapted,
maps (x, u1)→ H1(t, x, u1, u2, p, k,K) and x→ G1(x) are both convex, and
E
[
H1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K)
∣∣FYt ] = min
u1∈U1
E
[
H1(t, x
u1.u2 , u1, u2, p, k,K)
∣∣FYt ] (3.7)
holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. Then u¯1(·) is an optimal control of Problem of the follower.
Proof. For any u1(·) ∈ U1, we have
J1(u1(·), u2(·))− J1(u¯1(·), u2(·))
= E
[∫ T
0
[
Zu1,u2(t)l1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2)− Z
u¯1,u2(t)l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
]
dt
+ Zu1,u2(T )G1(x
u1,u2(T ))− Z u¯1,u2(T )G1(x
u¯1,u2(T ))
]
= E
[∫ T
0
[(
Zu1,u2(t)− Z u¯1,u2(t)
)
l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
]
dt
+
(
Zu1,u2(T )− Z u¯1,u2(T )
)
G1(x
u¯1,u2(T ))
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
[
Zu1,u2(t)
(
l1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2)− l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
)]
dt
+ Zu1,u2(T )
(
G1(x
u1,u2(T ))−G1(x
u¯1,u2(T ))
)]
≡ I + II.
(3.8)
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Due to the convexity of G1(·), we have
II ≥ Eu1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
[
l1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2)− l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
]
dt
+G1x(x
u¯1,u2(T ))(xu1,u2(T )− xu¯1,u2(T ))
]
.
(3.9)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (Zu1,u2(·)− Z u¯1,u2(·))P (·), it is easy to get
I = E
[ ∫ T
0
Zu1,u2(t)
[
h⊤(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2)− h
⊤(t, xu¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
]
K(t)dt
]
= Eu1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
〈
K(t), h(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2)− h(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
〉
dt
]
.
(3.10)
Similarly, applying Itoˆ’s formula to p(·)(xu1,u2(·)− xu¯1,u2(·)), by (3.9), we have
II ≥ Eu1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
[
H1(t, x
u1,u2 , u1, u2, p, k,K) −H1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K)
−
〈
K(t), h(t, xu1.u2 , u1, u2)− h(t, x
u¯1.u2 , u¯1, u2)
〉
−
〈
H1x(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K), x
u1,u2(t)− xu¯1,u2(t)
〉]
dt
]
.
(3.11)
Using the convexity of H1(t, ·, ·, u2, p, k,K), by (3.10) and (3.11), we obtain
I + II ≥ Eu1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
〈
H1u1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K), u1 − u¯1
〉
dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E
[
Zu1,u2(t)
〈
H1u1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K), u1 − u¯1
〉∣∣FYt ]dt
]
.
(3.12)
Noticing that Zu1,u2(·) > 0 is FYt -adapted, by the condition (3.7), we get
0 ≤
〈 ∂
∂u1
E
[
H1(t, x
u¯1.u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K)
∣∣FYt ], u1 − u¯1〉
= E
[〈
H1u1(t, x
u¯1.u2 , u¯1, u2, p, k,K), u1 − u¯1
〉∣∣FYt ].
(3.13)
Thus from (3.8) we have J1(u1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u¯1(·), u2(·)) ≥ 0, for any u1(·) ∈ U1. Then we
complete our proof.
3.2 The problem of the leader
In this subsection, we firstly state the stochastic optimal control problem with complete infor-
mation of the leader in detail, then we give the maximum principle and verification theorem
for it. For any u2(·) ∈ U2, by the maximum condition (3.3), we assume that a functional
u¯1(t) = u¯1(t; xˆ
u¯1,uˆ2 , uˆ2, pˆ, kˆ, Kˆ) is uniquely defined, where we set
xˆu¯1,uˆ2(t) := Eu¯1,u2
[
xu¯1,u2(t)
∣∣FYt ], φˆ(t) := Eu¯1,u2[φ(t)∣∣FYt ], t ∈ [0, T ], (3.14)
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for φ = u2, p, k,K. Firstly, the leader encounters the controlled system of FBSDEs:

dxu¯1,u2(t) = b(t, xu¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)dt+ σ(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)dW (t),
dZ u¯1,u2(t) = Z u¯1,u2(t)h⊤(t, xu¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)dY (t),
−dp(t) =
[
l1x(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2) + h
⊤
x (t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)K
⊤(t)
+ bx(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)p(t) + σx(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)k(t)
]
dt− k(t)dW (t),
−dP (t) =
[
l1(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2) +K(t)h(t, x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1, u2)
]
dt−K(t)dY (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xu¯1,u2(0) = x0, Z
u¯1,u2(0) = 1, p(T ) = G1x(x
u¯1,u2(T )), P (T ) = G1(x
u¯1,u2(T )).
(3.15)
For the simplicity of notations, we denote xu2(·) ≡ xu¯1,u2(·), Zu2(·) ≡ Z u¯1,u2(·) and define ΦL on
[0, T ]×Rn ×U2 as Φ
L(t, xu2 , u2) := Φ(t;x
u¯1,u2 , u¯1(t; xˆ
u¯1,uˆ2 , uˆ2, pˆ, kˆ, Kˆ), u2), for Φ = b, σ, h, l1, l2.
Thus the leader’s state equation (3.15) is equivalent to:

dxu2(t) = bL(t, xu2 , u2)dt+ σ
L(t, xu2 , u2)dW (t),
dZu2(t) = Zu2(t)hL(t, xu2 , u2)
⊤dY (t),
−dp(t) = fL1 (t, x
u2 , u2, p, k,K)dt − k(t)dW (t),
−dP (t) = fL2 (t, x
u2 , u2,K)dt−K(t)dY (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xu2(0) = x0, Z
u2(0) = 1, p(T ) = G1x(x
u2(T )), P (T ) = G1(x
u2(T )).
(3.16)
where we define
fL1 (t, x
u2 , u2, p, k,K) := l
L
1x(t, x
u2 , u2) + h
L
x (t, x
u2 , u2)
⊤K⊤(t)
+ bLx (t, x
u2 , u2)p(t) + σ
L
x (t, x
u2 , u2)k(t),
fL2 (t, x
u2 , u2,K) := l
L
1 (t, x
u2 , u2) +K(t)h
L(t, xu2 , u2).
We note that (3.16) is a controlled conditional mean-field FBSDEs, which now is regarded
as the “state” equation of the leader. That is to say, the state of the leader is the six-tuple
(xu2(·), Zu2(·), p(·), k(·), P (·),K(·)). By (2.8), we define
JL2 (u2(·)) := J2(u¯1(·), u2(·))
= Eu¯1,u2
[ ∫ T
0
l2(t, x
u¯1,u2(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))dt+G2(x
u¯1,u2(T ))
]
≡ Eu2
[ ∫ T
0
lL2 (t, x
u2(t), u2(t))dt+G2(x
u2(T ))
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Zu2(t)lL2 (t, x
u2(t), u2(t))dt+ Z
u2(T )G2(x
u2(T ))
]
.
(3.17)
Suppose u¯2(·) is an optimal control of Problem of the leader, and the associated optimal
state (xu¯2(·), Z u¯2(·), p¯(·), k¯(·), P¯ (·), K¯(·)) satisfies (3.16) with respect to u¯2(·). In order to derive
the maximum principle, we define the perturbed control uθ2(t) := u¯2(t) + θ(v2(t) − u¯2(t)), for
10
t ∈ [0, T ], where θ > 0 is sufficiently small and v2(·) is an arbitrary element of U2. The
convexity of U2 implies that u
θ
2(·) ∈ U2. Let (x
θ(·), Zθ(·), pθ(·), kθ(·), P θ(·),Kθ(·)) be the state
corresponding to uθ2(·). Keeping in mind that b
L, σL, hL, lL1 , l
L
2 depend on not only (x
u¯1,u2 , u2)
but also (xˆu¯1,uˆ2 , uˆ2, pˆ, kˆ, Kˆ). Then we introduce the following system of variational equations
whose solution is the six-tuple (x1(·), Z1(·), p1(·), k1(·), P 1(·),K1(·)):

dx1(t) =
[
b¯Lxx
1 + b¯Lxˆ xˆ
1 + b¯Lpˆ pˆ
1 + b¯L
kˆ
kˆ1 + b¯L
Kˆ
Kˆ1 + b¯Lu2(v2 − u¯2) + b¯
L
uˆ2
(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]
dt
+
[
σ¯Lx x
1 + σ¯Lxˆ xˆ
1 + σ¯Lpˆ pˆ
1 + σ¯L
kˆ
kˆ1 + σ¯L
Kˆ
Kˆ1 + σ¯Lu2(v2 − u¯2) + σ¯
L
uˆ2
(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]
dW (t),
dZ1(t) =
{
h¯L⊤Z1 + Z u¯2
[
h¯L⊤x x
1 + h¯L⊤xˆ xˆ
1 + h¯L⊤pˆ pˆ
1 + h¯L⊤
kˆ
kˆ1 + h¯L⊤
Kˆ
Kˆ1
+ h¯L⊤u2 (v2 − u¯2) + h¯
L⊤
uˆ2
(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]}
dY (t),
−dp1(t) =
[
f¯L1xx
1 + f¯L1xˆxˆ
1 + f¯L1pp
1 + f¯L1pˆpˆ
1 + f¯L1kk
1 + f¯L
1kˆ
kˆ1 + f¯L1KK
1 + f¯L
1Kˆ
Kˆ1
+ f¯L1u2(v2 − u¯2) + f¯
L
1uˆ2(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]
dt− k1(t)dW (t),
−dP 1(t) =
[
f¯L2xx
1 + f¯L2xˆxˆ
1 + f¯L2pˆpˆ
1 + f¯L
2kˆ
kˆ1 + f¯L2KK
1 + f¯L
2Kˆ
Kˆ1
+ f¯L2u2(v2 − u¯2) + f¯
L
2uˆ2(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]
dt−K1(t)dY (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x1(0) = 0, Z1(0) = 0, p1(T ) = G1xx(x
u¯2(T ))x1(T ), P 1(T ) = G1x(x
u¯2(T ))x1(T ),
(3.18)
where we have used Λ¯L(t) ≡ ΛL(t, xu¯2 , u¯2) for Λ = b, σ, h, f1, f2, l1, l2 and all their partial
derivatives.
Remark 3.1. It is necessary for us to analyze the system of variational equations (3.18), which
is nontrivial to derive, and we should notice that κˆ1 := E
u¯2 [κ1|F
Y
t ], for κ1 = x
1, Z1, p1, k1, P 1,K1,
v2−u¯2. Actually, for example, the part b¯
L
κˆ2
(
E
uθ
2 [κ
uθ
2
2 |F
Y
t ]−E
u¯2[κu¯22 |F
Y
t ]
)
, for κ2 = x,Z, p, k, P,K,
will appear when we apply the convex variation, which adds difficulty for deduction due to the
expectation Eu2 depending on the control variable u2. However, we could overcome this difficulty
under some assumptions, by converting it to the expectation E independent of u2. For this target,
we use Bayes’ rule to get
b¯Lκˆ2
(
E
uθ
2
[
κ
uθ
2
2
∣∣FYt ]− Eu¯2[κu¯22 ∣∣FYt ])
= b¯Lκˆ2
(
E
[
Zu
θ
2κ
uθ
2
2
∣∣FYt ]
E
[
Zu
θ
2
∣∣FYt ] −
E
[
Z u¯2κu¯22
∣∣FYt ]
E
[
Z u¯2
∣∣FYt ]
)
= b¯Lκˆ2
(
1
E
[
Zu
θ
2
∣∣FYt ]E
[
Zu
θ
2κ
uθ
2
2 − Z
u¯2κu¯22
∣∣FYt ]+ Eu¯2
[
κu¯22
∣∣FYt ]
E
[
Zu
θ
2
∣∣FYt ] E
[
Z u¯2 − Zu
θ
2
∣∣FYt ]
)
.
(3.19)
In the expression (3.19), E
[
Zu
θ
2κ
uθ
2
2 −Z
u¯2κu¯22
∣∣FYt ] and E[Z u¯2 −Zuθ2∣∣FYt ] are just what we want
to solve. However, we can not deal with the E[Zu
θ
2 |FYt ] part. Therefore, we reconsider the
assumption in Theorem 3.2 that “for all (t, u2) ∈ [0, T ]×U2, Z
u2(t) is FYt -adapted” (see Theorem
2 of [9]). Then for any u2(·) ∈ U2, Bayes’ formula results in
E
u2
[
κu22 (t)
∣∣FYt ] = E[κu22 (t)∣∣FYt ], Eu2[κ1(t)∣∣FYt ] = E[κ1(t)∣∣FYt ], (3.20)
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and
b¯Lκˆ2
(
E
uθ
2
[
κ
uθ
2
2
∣∣FYt ]− Eu¯2[κu¯22 ∣∣FYt ]) = b¯Lκˆ2(E[κuθ22 − κu¯22 ∣∣FYt ]), (3.21)
for κ1 = x
1, Z1, p1, k1, P 1,K1, v2 − u¯2 and κ2 = x,Z, p, k, P,K.
Then by means of (3.20) and (3.21), the system of variational equations (3.18) can be de-
rived. Similarly, the variational inequality (3.24) and equation (3.26) in the following can also
be obtained.
For any t ∈ [0, T ], we set λ˜θ(t) = λ
θ(t)−λu¯2 (t)
θ
− λ1(t), for λ = x,Z, p, k, P,K. By some
classical technique (see Wu [32], Wang et al. [28]), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.
lim
θ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|x˜θ(t)|2 = 0, lim
θ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|Z˜θ(t)|2 = 0,
lim
θ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|p˜θ(t)|2 = 0, lim
θ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|P˜ θ(t)|2 = 0,
lim
θ→0
E
∫ T
0
|k˜θ(t)|2dt = 0, lim
θ→0
E
∫ T
0
|K˜θ(t)|2dt = 0.
(3.22)
Then, we derive the variational inequality. Since u¯2(·) is an optimal control, we have
1
θ
[
JL2 (u
θ
2(·))− J
L
2 (u¯2(·))
]
≥ 0. (3.23)
Thus,
JL2 (u
θ
2(·))− J
L
2 (u¯2(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
[
Zθ(t)lL2 (t, x
θ, uθ2)− Z
u¯2(t)lL2 (t, x
u¯2 , u¯2)
]
dt
+ Zθ(T )G2(x
θ(T ))− Z u¯2(T )G2(x
u¯2(T ))
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
{(
Zθ(t)− Z u¯2(t)
)
l¯L2 (t) + Z
u¯2(t)
[
l¯L2x(t)(x
θ − xu¯2) + l¯L2xˆ(t)(xˆ
θ − xˆ
ˆ¯u2) + l¯L2pˆ(t)(pˆ
θ − ˆ¯p)
+ l¯L
2kˆ
(t)(kˆθ − ˆ¯k) + l¯L
2Kˆ
(t)(Kˆθ − ˆ¯K) + l¯L2u2(t)(u
θ
2 − u¯2) + l¯
L
2uˆ2(t)(uˆ
θ
2 − ˆ¯u2)
]}
dt
+ (Zθ(T )− Z u¯2(T ))G2(x
u¯2(T )) + Z u¯2(T )G2x(x
u¯2(T ))(xθ(T )− xu¯2(T ))
]
≥ 0.
From Lemma 3.2, when θ → 0, it follows that
1
θ
[
JL2 (u
θ
2(·))− J
L
2 (u¯2(·))
]
→ E
[ ∫ T
0
{
Z1(t)l¯L2 (t) + Z
u¯2(t)
[
l¯L2x(t)x
1 + l¯L2xˆ(t)xˆ
1
+ l¯L2pˆ(t)pˆ
1 + l¯L
2kˆ
(t)kˆ1 + l¯L
2Kˆ
(t)Kˆ1 + l¯L2u2(t)(v2 − u¯2) + l¯
L
2uˆ2(t)(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)
]}
dt
+ Z1(T )G2(x
u¯2(T )) + Z u¯2(T )G2x(x
u¯2(T ))x1(T )
]
≥ 0,
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i.e.
E
u¯2
[ ∫ T
0
[(
Z u¯2(t)
)−1
Z1(t)l¯L2 (t) + l¯
L
2x(t)x
1 + l¯L2xˆ(t)xˆ
1 + l¯L2pˆ(t)pˆ
1 + l¯L
2kˆ
(t)kˆ1
+ l¯L
2Kˆ
(t)Kˆ1 + l¯L2u2(t)(v2 − u¯2(t)) + l¯
L
2uˆ2(t)(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2(t))
]
dt
+
(
Z u¯2(T )
)−1
Z1(T )G2(x
u¯2(T )) +G2x(x
u¯2(T ))x1(T )
]
≥ 0.
(3.24)
Noticing that (Z u¯2(·))−1Z1(·) appears in (3.24), then we set Γ1(·) := (Z u¯2(·))−1Z1(·).
Firstly, applying Itoˆ’s formula to (Z u¯2(·))−1, we get
d(Z u¯2(t))−1 = −(Z u¯2(t))−1h¯L⊤(t)dY (t) + (Z u¯2(t))−1h¯L⊤(t)h¯L(t)dt. (3.25)
Secondly, applying Itoˆ’s formula to (Z u¯2(·))−1Z1(·), we obtain


dΓ1(t) =
[
h¯L⊤x (t)x
1(t) + h¯L⊤xˆ (t)xˆ
1(t) + h¯L⊤pˆ (t)pˆ
1(t) + h¯L⊤
kˆ
(t)kˆ1(t) + h¯L⊤
Kˆ
(t)Kˆ1(t)
+ h¯L⊤u2 (t)(v2 − u¯2(t)) + h¯
L⊤
uˆ2
(t)(vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2(t))
]
dW u¯2(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Γ1(0) = 0,
(3.26)
where W (·) and W u¯2(·) are two independent standard Brownian motions under the probability
P
u¯2 , dPu¯2 := Z u¯2(T )dP.
Next, we introduce the following system of adjoint equations, consisting of two SDEs and
two BSDEs, whose solution is the six-tuple (q(·), Q(·), ϕ(·), δ(·), α(·), β(·)):

dq(t) =
{
f¯L1pq + E
u¯2
[
l¯L2pˆ + h¯
L⊤
pˆ β + b¯
L
pˆϕ+ σ¯
L
pˆ δ + f¯
L
2pˆQ+ f¯
L
1pˆq
∣∣FYt ]}dt
+
{
f¯L1kq + E
u¯2
[
l¯L
2kˆ
+ h¯L⊤
kˆ
β + b¯L
kˆ
ϕ+ σ¯L
kˆ
δ + f¯L
2kˆ
Q+ f¯L
1kˆ
q
∣∣FYt ]}dW (t),
dQ(t) =
{
f¯L1Kq + E
u¯2
[
l¯L
2Kˆ
+ h¯L⊤
Kˆ
β + b¯L
Kˆ
ϕ+ σ¯L
Kˆ
δ + f¯L
2Kˆ
Q+ f¯L
1Kˆ
q
∣∣FYt ]}dW u¯2(t),
−dϕ(t) =
{
l¯L2x + h¯
L⊤
x β + b¯
L
xϕ+ σ¯
L
x δ + f¯
L
2xQ+ f¯
L
1xq + E
u¯2
[
l¯L2xˆ + h¯
L⊤
xˆ β + b¯
L
xˆϕ
+ σ¯Lxˆ δ + f¯
L
2xˆQ+ f¯
L
1xˆq
∣∣FYt ]}dt− δ(t)dW (t),
−dα(t) = l¯L2 (t)dt− β(t)dW
u¯2(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
q(0) = 0, Q(0) = 0, α(T ) = G2(x
u¯2(T )),
ϕ(T ) = G2x(x
u¯2(T )) +G1x(x
u¯2(T ))Q(T ) +G1xx(x
u¯2(T ))q(T ).
(3.27)
Then by the equations (3.18), (3.26) and (3.27), applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈x1(·), ϕ(·)〉−〈p1(·), q(·)〉
− 〈P 1(·), Q(·)〉 + 〈Γ1(·), α(·)〉 on [0, T ] and inserting it into (3.24), we derive
E
u¯2
[ ∫ T
0
{〈
l¯L2u2 + h¯
L⊤
u2
β + b¯Lu2ϕ+ σ¯
L
u2
δ + f¯L2u2Q+ f¯
L
1u2q, v2 − u¯2
〉
+
〈
E
u¯2
[
l¯L2uˆ2 + h¯
L⊤
uˆ2
β + b¯Luˆ2ϕ+ σ¯
L
uˆ2
δ + f¯L2uˆ2Q+ f¯
L
1uˆ2q
∣∣FYt ], (vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2)〉}dt
]
≥ 0.
(3.28)
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Define the Hamiltonian function H2 : [0, T ] × R
n × U2 × R
n × Rn×d1 × R1×d2 × Rn × R× Rn ×
R
n×d1 × Rn×d2 → R as
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, p, k,K; q,Q, ϕ, δ, β) := l
L
2 (t, x
u2 , u2) +
〈
β(t), hL(t, xu2 , u2)
〉
+
〈
ϕ(t), bL(t, xu2 , u2)
〉
+
〈
δ(t), σL(t, xu2 , u2)
〉
+
〈
Q(t), fL2 (t, x
u2 , u2,K)
〉
+
〈
q(t), fL1 (t, x
u2 , u2, p, k,K)
〉
.
(3.29)
Then the equations (3.27) is equivalent to:

dq(t) =
{
H¯2p(t) + E
u¯2
[
H¯2pˆ(t)
∣∣FYt ]}dt+ {H¯2k(t) + Eu¯2[H¯2kˆ(t)∣∣FYt ]}dW (t),
dQ(t) =
{
f¯L1K(t)q(t) + E
u¯2
[
H¯2Kˆ(t)
∣∣FYt ]}dW u¯2(t),
−dϕ(t) =
{
H¯2x(t) + E
u¯2
[
H¯2xˆ(t)
∣∣FYt ]}dt− δ(t)dW (t),
−dα(t) = l¯L2 (t)dt− β(t)dW
u¯2(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
q(0) = 0, Q(0) = 0, α(T ) = G2(x
u¯2(T )),
ϕ(T ) = G2x(x
u¯2(T )) +G1x(x
u¯2(T ))Q(T ) +G1xx(x
u¯2(T ))q(T ).
(3.30)
where we set H¯2λ(t) ≡ H2λ(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯, K¯; q,Q, ϕ, δ, β) for λ = x, xˆ, p, pˆ, k, kˆ, Kˆ.
From (3.28) and (3.29), it is easy to obtain the following maximum principle of the leader.
Theorem 3.3. Let (A1) and (A2) hold, and u¯2(·) ∈ U2 be an optimal control of Problem
of the leader and (xu¯2(·), Z u¯2(·), p¯(·), k¯(·), P¯ (·), K¯(·)) be the corresponding optimal state. Let
(q(·), Q(·), ϕ(·), δ(·), α(·), β(·)) be the adjoint six-tuple satisfying (3.30), then we have〈
H2u2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯, K¯; q,Q, ϕ, δ, β), v2 − u¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
E
u¯2
[
H2uˆ2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯, K¯; q,Q, ϕ, δ, β)
∣∣FYt ], vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2(t)〉 ≥ 0, (3.31)
a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], Pu¯2-a.s. holds for any v2 ∈ U2.
In the following, we wish to establish the verification theorem for Problem of the leader.
We aim to prove that, under some conditions, for any v2(·) ∈ U2, J
L
2 (v2(·)) − J
L
2 (u¯2(·)) ≥ 0
holds. However, we find that, during the duality procedure, when applying Itoˆ’s formula, taking
integral and expectation, we cannot guarantee that
E
u2
[ ∫ T
0
{
· · ·
}
dW u¯2(t)
]
= 0
holds for any u2(·) ∈ U2 where u¯2(·) is a candidate optimal control. The reason is that it is not
sure that W u¯2(·) is a Brownian motion under the expectation Eu2 . This is the main challenging
difficulty which is not easy to solve for us up to now. Therefore, in the following of this paper we
consider h(t, xu1,u2 , u1, u2) ≡ h(t). In this special case, Y (·) and W
u1,u2(·) are not controlled by
(u1(·), u2(·)) any more. Thus we could write W
u1,u2(·) ≡ W¯ (·) to be a Brownian motion under
the probability Pu1,u2 := P¯ directly. Moreover, the adjoint process (P (·),K(·)) is needless in the
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follower’s problem, therefore it causes the disappearance of the adjoint processes (α(·), β(·), Q(·))
in (3.30) of Problem of the leader.
In this case, (3.31) in Theorem 3.3 becomes
〈
H2u2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯; q, ϕ, δ), v2 − u¯2(t)
〉
+
〈
E¯
[
H2uˆ2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯; q, ϕ, δ)
∣∣FYt ], vˆ2 − ˆ¯u2(t)〉 ≥ 0, (3.32)
holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s., and for any v2 ∈ U2. Here, the expectation E¯ corresponds to the
uncontrolled probability measure Pu1,u2 := P¯. The Hamiltonian function (3.29) becomes
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, p, k; q, ϕ, δ) :=
〈
ϕ(t), bL(t, xu2 , u2)
〉
+
〈
δ(t), σL(t, xu2 , u2)
〉
+
〈
q(t), fL1 (t, x
u2 , u2, p, k)
〉
+ lL2 (t, x
u2 , u2),
(3.33)
and the adjoint FBSDE (3.30) for (q(·), ϕ(·), δ(·)) reduces to

dq(t) =
{
H¯2p(t) + E¯
[
H¯2pˆ(t)
∣∣FYt ]}dt+ {H¯2k(t) + E¯[H¯2kˆ(t)∣∣FYt ]}dW (t),
−dϕ(t) =
{
H¯2x(t) + E¯
[
H¯2xˆ(t)
∣∣FYt ]}dt− δ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
q(0) = 0, ϕ(T ) = G2x(x
u¯2(T )) +G1xx(x
u¯2(T ))q(T ).
(3.34)
We have the following result. The detailed proof is inspired by Yong and Zhou [40], by
Clarke’s generalized gradient. We omit it and let it to the interested readers.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold. Let u¯2(·) ∈ U2, (x
u¯2(·), p¯(·), k¯(·)) be the
corresponding state processes and G1x = Mx, that is, G1xx(x) ≡ M ∈ R
n. Let the ad-
joint equation (3.34) admits a solution triple (q(·), ϕ(·), δ(·)) and suppose that (xu2 , u2, p, k) →
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, p, k; q, ϕ, δ) and x→ G2(x) are convex. Suppose
H2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯; q, ϕ, δ) + E¯
[
H2(t, x
u¯2 , u¯2, p¯, k¯; q, ϕ, δ)
∣∣FYt ]
= min
u2∈U2
{
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, p, k; q, ϕ, δ) + E¯
[
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, p, k; q, ϕ, δ)
∣∣FYt ]} (3.35)
holds for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s. Then u¯2(·) is an optimal control of Problem of the leader
4 An LQ Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asym-
metric noisy observations
In this section, we deal with an LQ Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric
noisy observations, where the maximum principle and verification theorem developed in the
previous section will be useful tools. For notational simplicity, we only consider the case for
n = d1 = d2 = m1 = m2 = 1.
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4.1 The problem of the follower
Let us consider the following controlled SDE:

dxu1,u2(t) =
[
A(t)xu1,u2(t) +B1(t)u1(t) +B2(t)u2(t)
]
dt
+
[
C(t)xu1,u2(t) +D1(t)u1(t) +D2(t)u2(t)
]
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xu1,u2(0) = x0,
(4.1)
and the observation equation:{
dY (t) = h(t)dt + dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (0) = 0,
(4.2)
where x0 ∈ R and A(·), B1(·), B2(·), C(·),D1(·),D2(·) and h(·) are given deterministic functions.
We introduce the following assumption:
(H1) A(·), B1(·), B2(·), C(·),D1(·) and D2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;R).
Firstly, for any chosen u2(·) ∈ U2, the follower would like to choose an F
Y
t -adapted control
u¯1(·) to minimize his cost functional
J1(u1(·), u2(·)) =
1
2
E¯
[ ∫ T
0
{
Q1(t)
∣∣xu1,u2(t)∣∣2 +R1(t)∣∣u1(t)∣∣2}dt+G1∣∣xu1,u2(T )∣∣2
]
, (4.3)
where the expectation E¯ is corresponding to the probability measure Pu1,u2 = P¯ under which
W (·) and W¯ (·) are independent standard Brownian motion mentioned in the previous section.
And we also suppose that
(H2) Q1(·) ≥ 0, R1(·) > 0 and G1 ≥ 0 are bounded and deterministic, R
−1
1 (·) is also
bounded.
We write the follower’s Hamiltonian function
H1(t, x, u1, u2, p, k) =
[
A(t)x+B1(t)u1 +B2(t)u2
]
p(t)
+
[
C(t)x+D1(t)u1 +D2(t)u2
]
k(t) +
1
2
Q1(t)x
2 +
1
2
R1(t)u
2
1.
(4.4)
From Theorem 3.1, if u¯1(·) is the optimal control, then we have
u¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)
[
B1(t)pˆ(t) +D1(t)kˆ(t)
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s., (4.5)
with pˆ(t) := E¯[p(t)|FYt ] and kˆ(t) := E¯[k(t)|F
Y
t ], where (p(·), k(·)) is the Ft-adapted solution to
the following adjoint BSDE:{
−dp(t) =
[
Q1(t)x
u¯1,u2(t) +A(t)p(t) + C(t)k(t)
]
dt− k(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = G1x
u¯1,u2(T ).
(4.6)
Noticing that the representation of u¯1(·) contains the filtering estimate of the second component
k(·) of the solution to (4.6), since the control variables enter into the diffusion term of (4.1).
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Observing the terminal condition in the equation (4.6), and the appearance of u2(·), we set
p(t) = P (t)xu¯1,u2(t) + Θ(t), t ∈ [0, T ], (4.7)
for some deterministic and differentiable R-valued function P (·) with P (T ) = G1, and R-valued,
Ft-adapted process pair (Θ(·),Γ(·)) satisfying the BSDE:
dΘ(t) = Ξ(t)dt+ Γ(t)dY (t), t ∈ [0, T ], Θ(T ) = 0. (4.8)
In the above equation, Ξ(·) is an Ft-adapted process to be determined later. Applying Itoˆ’s
formula to (4.7) and noting (4.2), (4.8), we have
dp(t) =
[
P˙ xu¯1,u2 +APxu¯1,u2 + PB1u¯1 + PB2u¯2 + Ξ + Γh
]
dt
+ P
[
Cxu¯1,u2 +D1u¯1 +D2u2
]
dW (t) + ΓdW¯ (t).
(4.9)
Comparing (4.9) and (4.6), we get
−
(
Q1x
u¯1,u2 +Ap+ Ck
)
= P˙ xu¯1,u2 +APxu¯1,u2 + PB1u¯1 + PB2u2 + Ξ + Γh, (4.10)
k = P
(
Cxu¯1,u2 +D1u¯1 +D2u2
)
, P¯-a.s., (4.11)
Γ = 0, P¯-a.s. (4.12)
Thus (4.8) has the unique Ft-adapted solution (Θ(·), 0), which in fact reduces to a backward
random differential equation (BRDE for short).
Substituting (4.7) and (4.11) into (4.5), and supposing that
(H3) (D21P +R1)
−1 exist,
we obtain
u¯1 =− (D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
u¯1,uˆ2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B1Θˆ
− (D21P +R1)
−1D1D2Puˆ2, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s.,
(4.13)
where xˆu¯1,uˆ2(t) := E¯[xu¯1,u2(t)|FYt ], Θˆ(t) := E¯[Θ(t)|F
Y
t ] and uˆ2(t) := E¯[u2(t)|F
Y
t ].
Inserting (4.7), (4.11) and (4.13) into (4.10), we obtain that if the Riccati equation:
{
P˙ + 2AP + C2P − (D21P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)
2P 2 +Q1 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P (T ) = G1,
(4.14)
admits a unique solution P (·), then we have
Ξ = −(B1 +D1C)
2(D21P +R1)
−1P 2xu¯1,u2 + (B1 +D1C)
2(D21P +R1)
−1P 2xˆu¯1,uˆ2
− (B2 +D2C)Pu2 + (B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2uˆ2
+ (B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P Θˆ−AΘ.
(4.15)
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With (4.15), the BRDE (4.8) takes the form

−dΘ(t) =
[
(B1 +D1C)
2(D21P +R1)
−1P 2
(
xu¯1,u2 − xˆu¯1,uˆ2
)
+ (B2 +D2C)Pu2 − (B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2uˆ2
− (B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P Θˆ +AΘ
]
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Θ(T ) = 0.
(4.16)
Moreover, for given u2(·), plugging (4.13) into (4.1), we derive

dxu¯1,u2(t) =
[
Axu¯1,u2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
u¯1,uˆ2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B21Θˆ
−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2Puˆ2 +B2u2
]
dt+
[
Cxu¯1,u2
−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
u¯1,uˆ2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1Θˆ
− (D21P +R1)
−1D21D2Puˆ2 +D2u2
]
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xu¯1,u2(0) = x0.
(4.17)
Therefore, from the observation equation (4.2) and applying Theorem 8.1 in Lisptser and
Shiryayev [15], we can derive the following optimal filtering equation:

dxˆu¯1,uˆ2(t) =
{[
A−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P
]
xˆu¯1,uˆ2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B21Θˆ
+
[
B2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
]
uˆ2
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xˆu¯1,uˆ2(0) = x0,
(4.18)
which admits a unique FYt -adapted solution xˆ
u¯1,uˆ2(·), as long as Θˆ(·) is determined.
In fact, similarly, by (4.16) we have

−dΘˆ(t) =
{
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
uˆ2
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
Θˆ
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Θˆ(T ) = 0,
(4.19)
which admits a unique FYt -adapted solution Θˆ(·), for given uˆ2(·). Putting (4.18) and (4.19)
together, we get the following forward-backward random differential filtering equation (FBRDFE
for short):

dxˆu¯1,uˆ2(t) =
{[
A−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P
]
xˆu¯1,uˆ2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B21Θˆ
+
[
B2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
]
uˆ2
}
dt,
−dΘˆ(t) =
{
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
uˆ2
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
Θˆ
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xˆu¯1,uˆ2(0) = x0, Θˆ(T ) = 0,
(4.20)
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which admits a unique FYt -adapted solution (xˆ
u¯1,uˆ2(·), Θˆ(·)) ≡ (xˆu¯1,uˆ2(·), Θˆ(·), 0), for given uˆ2(·).
Now, noting that the conditions in Theorem 3.2 are satisfied, we could summarize the above
procedure in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let (H1)-(H3) hold, and P (·) satisfies (4.14). For given u2(·) of the leader,
u¯1(·) given by (4.13) is the state estimate feedback optimal control of the follower, where (xˆ
u¯1,uˆ2(·), Θˆ(·))
is the unique FYt -adapted solution to (4.20).
4.2 Problem of the leader
Since the leader knows that the follower will take u¯1(·) by (4.13), the state equation of the leader
can be written as:

dxu2(t) =
[
Axu2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
uˆ2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B21Θˆ
−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2Puˆ2 +B2u2
]
dt
+
[
Cxu2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
uˆ2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1Θˆ
− (D21P +R1)
−1D21D2Puˆ2 +D2u2]dW (t),
−dΘˆ(t) =
{
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
uˆ2
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
Θˆ
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xu2(0) = x0, Θˆ(T ) = 0,
(4.21)
where xu2(·) := xu¯1,u2(·) and xˆuˆ2(·) := xˆu¯1,uˆ2(·). Note that (4.21) is a decoupled conditional
mean-field FBSDE, and its solvability can be easily obtained. The leader would like to choose
an Ft-adapted control u¯2(·) to minimize his cost functional
J2(u2(·)) =
1
2
E¯
[ ∫ T
0
{
Q2(t)
∣∣xu2(t)∣∣2 +R2(t)∣∣u2(t)∣∣2}dt+G2∣∣xu2(T )∣∣2
]
. (4.22)
We suppose
(H4) Q2(·) ≥ 0, R2(·) > 0 and G2 ≥ 0 are bounded and deterministic, R
−1
2 (·) is also
bounded.
Applying Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4, we can write the leader’s Hamiltonian function
H2(t, x
u2 , u2, Θˆ; q, ϕ, δ)
=
1
2
Q2(x
u2)2 +
1
2
R2u
2
2 +
[
Axu2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
uˆ2
− (D21P +R1)
−1B21Θˆ−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2Puˆ2 +B2u2
]
ϕ
+
[
Cxu2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
uˆ2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1Θˆ
− (D21P +R1)
−1D21D2Puˆ2 +D2u2
]
δ −
{[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2
− (B2 +D2C)P
]
uˆ2 +
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
Θˆ
}
q.
(4.23)
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The optimal control u2(·) of the leader satisfies:
R2u¯2 +B2ϕ+D2δ −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2Pϕˆ− (D
2
1P +R1)
−1D21D2P δˆ
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
qˆ = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s.,
(4.24)
with ϕˆ(t) := E¯[ϕ(t)|FYt ], δˆ(t) := E¯[δ(t)|F
Y
t ] and qˆ(t) := E¯[q(t)|F
Y
t ], where (q(·), ϕ(·), δ(·)) satis-
fies the adjoint FBSDE:

dq(t) =
{
− (D21P +R1)
−1B21ϕ−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1δ
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
q
}
dt,
−dϕ(t) =
[
Q2x
u¯2 +Aϕ+ Cδ −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pϕˆ
−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P δˆ
]
dt− δ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
q(0) = 0, ϕ(T ) = G2x
u¯2(T ) +G1q(T ).
(4.25)
Next, for obtaining the state feedback representation of u¯2(·) via some Riccati equations, let us
put (4.21) (for u¯2(·)) and (4.25) together and regard
(
xu¯2(·)
q(·)
)
as the optimal “state”:


dxu¯2(t) =
[
Axu¯2 −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
ˆ¯u2 − (D21P +R1)
−1B21
ˆ¯Θ
−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P ˆ¯u2 +B2u¯2
]
dt
+
[
Cxu¯2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pxˆ
ˆ¯u2 −D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1
ˆ¯Θ
− (D21P +R1)
−1D21D2P ˆ¯u2 +D2u¯2
]
dW (t),
dq(t) =
{
− (D21P +R1)
−1B21ϕ−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1δ
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
q
}
dt,
−dϕ(t) =
[
Q2x
u¯2 +Aϕ+ Cδ −B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)Pϕˆ
−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P δˆ
]
dt− δ(t)dW (t),
−d ˆ¯Θ(t) =
{
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
ˆ¯u2
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
] ˆ¯Θ}dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
xu¯2(0) = x0, q(0) = 0, ϕ(T ) = G2x
u¯2(T ) +G1q(T ),
ˆ¯Θ(T ) = 0.
(4.26)
Then, we put
X =
(
xu¯2
q
)
, Y =
(
ϕ
ˆ¯Θ
)
, Z =
(
δ
0
)
, X0 =
(
x0
0
)
, G¯ =
(
G2 G1
0 0
)
, (4.27)
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and 

A1 =
(
A 0
0 −
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1P −A
]
)
,
A2 =
(
−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P 0
0 0
)
, A3 =
(
C 0
0 0
)
,
A4 =
(
−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P 0
0 0
)
, A5 =
(
Q 0
0 0
)
,
B1 =
(
0 −(D21P +R1)
−1B21
−(D21P +R1)
−1B21 0
)
,
C1 =
(
0 0
−D1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1B1 0
)
, D1 =
(
−B1(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
0
)
,
D2 =
(
B2
0
)
, D3 =
(
−(D21P +R1)
−1D21D2P
0
)
, D4 =
(
D2
0
)
,
D5 =
(
0
−
[
(B1 +D1C)(D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2P
2 − (B2 +D2C)P
]
)
.
Then the equation (4.26) can be rewritten as

dX(t) =
[
A1X +A2Xˆ + B1Y + C1Z +D1 ˆ¯u2 +D2u¯2
]
dt
+
[
A3X +A4Xˆ + C
⊤
1 Y +D3 ˆ¯u2 +D4u¯2
]
dW (t),
−dY (t) =
[
A5X +A1Y +A2Yˆ +A3Z +A4Zˆ +D5 ˆ¯u2
]
dt− Z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = X0, Y (T ) = G¯X(T ),
(4.28)
and (4.24) can be represented as
R2u¯2 +D
⊤
2 Y +D
⊤
4 Z +D
⊤
1 Yˆ +D
⊤
3 Zˆ +D
⊤
5 Xˆ = 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s. (4.29)
Thus we have
u¯2 = −R
−1
2
[
D⊤2 Y +D
⊤
4 Z +D
⊤
1 Yˆ +D
⊤
3 Zˆ +D
⊤
5 Xˆ
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s., (4.30)
and
ˆ¯u2 = −R
−1
2
[
(D1 +D2)
⊤Yˆ + (D3 +D4)
⊤Zˆ +D⊤5 Xˆ
]
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s. (4.31)
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Inserting (4.30) and (4.31) into (4.28), we get

dX(t) =
{
A1X +
[
A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ + (B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−
[
D1R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ + (C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Z
−
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ
}
dt
+
{
A3X +
[
A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ + (C⊤ −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−
[
D3R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 Z
−
[
D3R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ
}
dW (t),
−dY (t) =
{
A5X +A1Y +
[
A2 −D5R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
Yˆ +A3Z
+
[
A4 −D5R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
Zˆ −D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 Xˆ
}
dt− ZdW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = X0, Y (T ) = G¯X(T ).
(4.32)
In order to decouple the conditional mean-field system (4.32), we set
Y (t) = Π1(t)X(t) + Π2(t)Xˆ(t), (4.33)
where Π1(·) and Π2(·) are both differentiable, deterministic matrix-valued functions with Π1(T ) =
G¯ and Π2(T ) = 0.
First, from the forward equation of (4.32), applying again Theorem 8.1 in [15], we obtain


dXˆ(t) =
{[
A1 +A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +
[
B1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
Yˆ
+
[
C1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
Zˆ
}
dt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Xˆ(0) = X0.
(4.34)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.33), we have
dY (t) =
{
Π˙1X +Π1A1X +Π1
[
A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−Π1
[
D1R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ +Π1(C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Z
−Π1
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ + Π˙2Xˆ +Π2
[
A1 +A2
− (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +Π2
[
B1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
Yˆ
+Π2
[
C1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
Zˆ
}
dt
+
{
Π1A3X +Π1
[
A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +Π1(C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ −Π1D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 Z
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ
}
dW (t).
(4.35)
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Comparing the diffusion term between the BSDE in (4.32) and (4.35), it yields
Z = Π1A3X +Π1
[
A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +Π1(C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ −Π1D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 Z
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ, P¯-a.s.
(4.36)
Taking E¯[·|FYt ] on both sides of (4.36), and supposing that
(H5) M1 :=
[
I +Π1(D3 +D4)R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]−1
exists,
we have
Zˆ = Σ1(Π1,Π2)Xˆ, P¯-a.s., (4.37)
where
Σ1(Π1,Π2) :=M1
{
Π1
[
A3 +A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
+Π1
[
C⊤1 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
(Π1 +Π2)
}
.
Then putting (4.37) back into (4.36), and supposing that
(H6) M2 :=
[
I +Π1D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4
]−1
exists,
we get
Z = Σ2(Π1)X +Σ3(Π1,Π2)Xˆ, P¯-a.s., (4.38)
where
Σ2(Π1) :=M2
[
Π1A3 +Π1(C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1
]
,
Σ3(Π1,Π2) :=M2
{
Π1
[
A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
+Π1(C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
(Π1 +Π2)
−Π1
[
D3R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Σ1(Π1,Π2)
}
.
Next, comparing the drift term between the BSDE in (4.32) and (4.35), it leads to
Π˙1X +Π1A1X +Π1
[
A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ +Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Y
−Π1
[
D1R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
Yˆ +Π1(C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Z
−Π1
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Zˆ + Π˙2Xˆ +Π2
[
A1 +A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ
+Π2
[
B1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
Yˆ +Π2
[
C1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
Zˆ
+A5X +A1Y +
[
A2 −D5R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
Yˆ +A3Z +
[
A4 −D5R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
Zˆ
−D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 Xˆ = 0.
(4.39)
After inserting (4.33), (4.37) and (4.38) into (4.39), we derive the following two Riccati equations:

Π˙1 +Π1A1 +A1Π1 +Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 +A5 +
[
A3 +Π1(C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )
]
×M2Π1
[
A3 + (C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1
]
= 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
Π1(T ) = G¯,
(4.40)
23


Π˙2 + (Π1 +Π2)
[
A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
]
+
[
A2 −D5R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
(Π1 +Π2)
+ Π2A1 +A1Π2 + (Π1 +Π2)
[
B1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
(Π1 +Π2)
−Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 +
[
A3 +Π1(C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )
]
Σ3(Π1,Π2)
+
{[
A4 −D5R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
+Π2
[
C1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤
]
−Π1
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]}
Σ1(Π1,Π2)−D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
Π2(T ) = 0.
(4.41)
Remark 4.1. The two Riccati equations (4.40) and (4.41) are not standard and entirely new,
and we cannot obtain their solvability up to now. However, a special case could be dealt with by
some existing reuslts.
We consider the case that D1 = D2 = 0, then we have A4 = C1 = D1 = D3 = D4 = 0. The
Riccati equations (4.40) and (4.41) of Π1(·) and Π2(·) reduce to:{
Π˙1 +Π1A1 +A1Π1 +Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 +A3Π1A3 +A5 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
Π1(T ) = G¯,
(4.42)


Π˙2 +Π2(A1 +A2 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 ) + (A1 +A2 −D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2 −D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
+Π1(A2 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 ) + (A2 −D5R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 +Π2(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2
+Π1(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2 +Π2(B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
Π2(T ) = 0,
(4.43)
respectively. The solvability of (4.42) and (4.43) can be guaranteed by the sufficient conditions
in Chapter 6 of Yong and Zhou [40] and Theorem 5.3 of Yong [38]. We omit the details.
Substituting (4.33), (4.37) and (4.38) into (4.30), we get
u¯2 =−R
−1
2
{[
D⊤2 Π1 +D
⊤
4 Σ2(Π1)
]
X +
[
D⊤1 (Π1 +Π2) +D
⊤
2 Π2 +D
⊤
3 Σ1(Π1,Π2)
+D⊤4 Σ3(Π1,Π2) +D
⊤
5
]
Xˆ
}
, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s.,
(4.44)
where the optimal “state” X(·) and its optimal estimate Xˆ(·) satisfy

dX(t) =
{[
A1 + (B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 + (C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Σ2(Π1)
]
X +
[
A2 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2
×D⊤5 + (B1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2 −
[
D1R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
(Π1 +Π2) + (C1
−D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Σ3(Π1,Π2)−
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Σ1(Π1,Π2)
]
Xˆ
}
dt
+
{[
A3 + (C
⊤
1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 Σ2(Π1)
]
X +
[
A4 − (D3 +D4)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5
+ (C⊤1 −D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
2 )Π2 −
[
D3R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
1
]
(Π1 +Π2)−D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
4
× Σ3(Π1,Π2)−
[
D3R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D4R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Σ1(Π1,Π2)
]
Xˆ
}
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = X0,
(4.45)
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and 

dXˆ(t) =
{
A1 +A2 +
[
B1 − (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 (D1 +D2)
⊤
]
(Π1 +Π2)
− (D1 +D2)R
−1
2 D
⊤
5 + (C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Σ2(Π1)
−
[
D1R
−1
2 (D3 +D4)
⊤ +D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
3
]
Σ1(Π1,Π2)
+ (C1 −D2R
−1
2 D
⊤
4 )Σ3(Π1,Π2)
}
Xˆdt, t ∈ [0, T ],
Xˆ(0) = X0,
(4.46)
respectively. We summarize the above in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let (H1)-(H6) hold, Π1(·) and Π2(·) satisfy (4.40) and (4.41), respectively,
X(·) be the Ft-adapted solution to (4.45), and Xˆ(·) be the F
Y
t -adapted solution to (4.46). Define
Y (·), Z(·) and Zˆ(·) by (4.33), (4.38) and (4.37), respectively. Then equation (4.32) holds and
u¯2(·) given by (4.44) is the state estimate feedback representation of the leader’s optimal control.
Finally, the optimal control u¯1(·) of the follower can also be represented in Xˆ(·). More
precisely, by (4.13), noting (4.27) and (4.30), we derive
u¯1 =
{
A6 + B2(Π1 +Π2) + (D
2
1P +R1)
−1D1D2PR
−1
2
[
(D1 +D2)
⊤(Π1 +Π2)
+ (D3 +D4)
⊤Σ1(Π1,Π2) +D
⊤
5
]}
Xˆ, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P¯-a.s.,
(4.47)
where A6 :=
(
−(D21P +R1)
−1(B1 +D1C)P 0
)
and B2 :=
(
0 −(D21P +R1)
−1B1
)
.
Thus, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) is given by (4.47) and (4.44), in
its state estimate feedback form.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric
noisy observation. This kind of game problem has three interesting characteristics worthy of
being emphasized. Firstly, the follower could only observe the noisy observation process, while
the leader can observe both the state and noisy observation processes. Thus, the information
between the follower and the leader has the asymmetric feature. Second, the leader’s problem
is solved under some mild assumption, with the aid of some new Riccati equations. Finally, the
optimal control of the leader relies not only on the state but also on its estimate based on the
observation process.
Possible extension to the Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and
observation noises, applying state decomposition and backward separation principle (Wang et
al. [28, 29, 30]), rather than Girsanov’s measure transformation, are worthy to research. The
general solvability of the Riccati equations (4.42) and (4.43) requires systematic study. We will
consider these topics in the future research.
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